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Note 
MAKING THE JUMP FROM GENE POOLS TO PATENT POOLS: HOW 
PATENT POOLS CAN FACILITATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
PHARMACOGENOMICS 
COURTNEY C. SCALA 
While promising great advancement in the understanding of genetic 
variability and drug response, the rapidly growing field of 
pharmacogenomics is plagued with an increasingly complex landscape of 
intellectual property rights.  The often prohibitive transaction costs of 
negotiating a multitude of licensing agreements threaten to stifle 
innovation and limit the success that many hope pharmacogenomics will 
bring to personalized medicine.  By aggregating intellectual property 
rights, patent pools offer an intriguing solution to some of the access issues 
confronting the pharmacogenomics industry.  In the face of a proliferation 
of genomic patents, patent pools provide a unique opportunity to navigate 
the patent thicket and render proprietary technologies more accessible for 
use in the creation of new, potentially patentable, genomic technologies. 
This Note examines the possibility of utilizing patent pools in order to 
facilitate the advancement of pharmacogenomics and, ultimately, a new 
era of personalized medicine.  Specifically, this Note argues that patent 
pools minimize the threat of an anticommons, reduce transaction costs and 
are pro-competitive intellectual property tools that contribute to the 
growth of new emerging technologies in well-defined commercial settings.  
Finally, this Note suggests that patent pools are a particularly viable 
option in the field of gene-based diagnostic testing, which could serve as 
an illustration of how patent pools can facilitate scientific innovation. 
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 MAKING THE JUMP FROM GENE POOLS TO PATENT POOLS: HOW 
PATENT POOLS CAN FACILITATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
PHARMACOGENOMICS 
COURTNEY C. SCALA∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an era of rising health care costs and increased barriers to affordable 
and effective drugs, pharmacogenomics offers the promise of improved 
patient care and disease prevention in an approach to medicine that is truly 
“personalized.”1  By examining patterns of genetic variation across a 
population, pharmacogenomics attempts to identify genetic differences that 
influence drug metabolism and response in order to correlate those 
differences with drug efficacy and safety information.2  The ability to 
distinguish in advance, before a prescription is written, whether a patient 
should take a particular drug, avoid the drug entirely, or take it in an 
adjusted dosage, could result in significant cost savings for the health care 
system.3  In a September 2008 report entitled “Priorities for Personalized 
Medicine,” the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST) proposed a number of policy recommendations to 
help facilitate the progress of personalized medicine, concluding that 
genomics-based molecular diagnostics will be “the essential driver for the 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Princeton University, A.B. 2004; University of Melbourne, Master of Social Policy, 2005; 
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010.  I would like to extend my gratitude to 
Professors Audrey R. Chapman and Lewis Kurlantzick for their invaluable comments and guidance 
throughout the writing process.  I would also like to thank Christophe Renaud for his expertise and 
encouragement as well as the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their hard work.  This Note 
is dedicated to my parents for their constant love and support; they have always taught me to be a 
problem-solving thinker.  Any errors contained herein are mine and mine alone. 
1 Priorities for Personalized Medicine, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., 
1 (2008), available at http://www.ostp.gov/galleries/PCAST/pcast_report_v2.pdf [hereinafter PCAST 
REPORT].  Pharmacogenomics is the science that anchors what is commonly referred to as 
“personalized medicine.”  Teresa Kelton, Pharmacogenomics: The Re-Discovery of the Concept of 
Tailored Drug Therapy and Personalized Medicine, 19 HEALTH LAW 1, 1 (2007). 
2 Nusrat Khaleeli & Dennis Fernandez, Patent Prosecution in Pharmacogenomics, 88 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 83, 86 (2006).  The foundational genetic units used in pharmacogenomic 
research are single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are single base pair differences in an 
individual’s DNA that can sometimes affect the way that the individual responds to drugs.  Many SNPs 
occur in important coding regions of the human genome (i.e., DNA sequences that are used in the 
translation from nucleic acids to proteins).  These single variations, which can sometimes cause 
particular genetic diseases, also influence a drug’s potency and efficacy, and can even explain why 
some patients, but not others, suffer from adverse reactions to certain medications.  Id. at 86–87. 
3 PCAST REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.  “Moreover, the ability to stratify patients by disease 
susceptibility or likely response to treatment could also reduce the size, duration, and cost of clinical 
trials, thus facilitating the development of new treatments, diagnostics, and prevention strategies.”  Id. 
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expanding promise of personalized medicine . . . .”4  PCAST 
recommended that the health care industry’s top priority should be to 
develop the technology and tools to understand how human genetic 
variability affects disease susceptibility and why different individuals 
sometimes react differently to the same medication.5   
While PCAST recognized the extraordinary potential for technologies 
to accelerate progress in personalized medicine, the report refrained from 
addressing the “enormously complex” intellectual property (IP) issues 
facing pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies involved in the 
various sectors of the genomics industry.6  One of the reasons that IP rights 
are so complicated in the biotechnology and genomics industries is that the 
number of overlapping patent claims increases as new genetic inventions, 
research tools, and data management methods are patented.  The rising 
transaction costs associated with negotiating a myriad of patent licenses 
threaten to deter competitors from investing in pharmacogenomics, thus 
stifling innovation and hindering further advancement.   
Due to the widespread patenting of research techniques that were 
traditionally available in the public domain, commercial firms and research 
institutions are encountering significant delays in their work.7  A great deal 
of concern has been voiced regarding the difficulty of accessing patented 
genomic technologies for basic biological research and development 
(R&D).8  As the pharmacogenomics industry becomes more commercially 
                                                                                                                          
4 Id. at 19. 
Genomics-based molecular diagnostics offer the possibility of correlating genetic 
profiles with disease occurrence, disease outcome, response to therapy, adverse 
events, and other factors, without the need to fully understand the underlying 
biological mechanisms—the specific genes that are involved, the impact of the 
genes on physiology, and the way they function in concert.  Genetic profiles will 
also be instrumental in identifying known genes or gene variants that correlate with 
various disease outcomes, as well as in identifying genetic regions correlated with 
outcome that can be investigated for previously unknown genes.  Genetic profiles 
will thus facilitate the development of new single gene or protein tests as well as 
new therapies that target the consequences of specific genetic alterations. 
Id. 
5 Id. at 19, 29. 
6 Id. at 21–22. 
7 Anatole Krattiger & Stanley P. Kowalski, Facilitating Assembly of and Access to Intellectual 
Property: Focus on Patent Pools and a Review of Other Mechanisms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 131, 
140 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007).  Specific hindrances in biotechnology research and 
development (R&D) include uncertainty over license costs, delays in obtaining licenses, and the 
different definitions of “pure research” versus “product development” licensing.  Id. 
8 Id.  This Note does not attempt to address the ethical considerations surrounding gene patents, a 
debate which has received considerable attention in the scholarly literature.  See, e.g., The Ethics of 
Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper, NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2002), available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf; Lori B. Andrews & 
Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethics Scrutiny and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 403 (2005).  Rather, this Note accepts the view that biotechnology innovation is 
heavily dependent on intellectual property rights, and it will focus on exploring how patents can be 
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focused, patent pools offer a potentially effective solution to some of these 
fundamental challenges.9 
In a patent pool, IP rights are aggregated amongst multiple patent 
holders, the pooled patents are made available to member and non-member 
licensees, and the typical pool allocates a portion of the licensing fees it 
collects to each member according to each patent’s contributory value.10  
In other words, IP rights holders combine widely dispersed property rights 
into “useable bundles,” thus mitigating the problems associated with 
anticommons theory while still preserving the incentives that come with 
these rights.11   
Patent pools are an effective means of cutting through the “patent 
thicket” that exists in the pharmacogenomics industry.  A patent thicket is 
“a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company 
must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new 
technology.”12  When patent claims are broad, various patents may overlap 
with each other such that patent holders may be able to lay claim to the 
same technologies or to aspects of the same technology.13  These 
overlapping rights, or blocking patents, contribute to the density of the 
patent thicket and threaten innovation.  This fragmentation of IP rights can 
increase the costs of bringing new products to market due to the high 
transaction costs of negotiating and obtaining multiple licenses from 
multiple patent holders.  Subsequently, the key concern is that scientists 
and research entities will opt not to compete in the field, thus potentially 
stifling innovation.14  Patent pools can help solve the problems created by 
                                                                                                                          
used and licensed through a patent pool so that advancements in pharmacogenomics research can 
continue to be made in a more efficient and cost-effective manner.  The impetus for embarking on this 
analysis can be summarized by the following statement issued by PCAST: “The ability to obtain strong 
intellectual property protection through patents has been, and will continue to be, essential for 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies to make the large, high-risk R&D investments required 
to develop novel medical products, including genomics-based molecular diagnostics.”  PCAST 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. 
9 Krattiger & Kowalski, supra note 7, at 140. 
10 Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent 
Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE 
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123, 129 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). 
11 Id.  For a description and discussion of the “anticommons,” see infra Part II.B. 
12 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffee et al. eds., 2001). 
13 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1614 
(2003). 
14 In 2002, the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
held a series of joint hearings entitled “Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy.”  The agencies heard testimony from more than 300 commentators, 
representing the biotechnology, computer, and pharmaceutical industries; inventors; and leading 
scholars and practitioners specializing in antitrust law, intellectual property law, and economics.  
Speakers testified on a range of topics, including “Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing: When Do They 
Promote or Harm Competition?”  The full schedule and transcripts of the FTC/DOJ hearings is 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).  See also Press Release, 
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the patent thicket by reducing transaction costs for licensees while 
simultaneously preserving the financial incentives for patent holders to 
commercialize their existing products and undertake new, potentially 
patentable research.15   
Historically known for their role in the aircraft and automobile 
industries in the early 1900s, patent pools have experienced a re-
emergence in the latter half of the twentieth century.16  Most notably, 
successful patent pools for DVD and MPEG-2 compression technology 
revolutionized the DVD and television industries by allowing 
manufacturers to concentrate their efforts on improvements and new 
product development rather than being delayed by license negotiations and 
other impediments.  The pools enjoyed this success because they offered 
market participants something they could not find elsewhere: a way of not 
only cutting through the patent thicket, but also increasing efficiency by 
offering a one-stop licensing mechanism for new users to develop new 
products and encourage greater participation and innovation in the field.  
Patent pools allowed these emerging technologies to develop at a faster 
pace, with more competitors and greater efficiencies than ever before. 
Patent pools offer the rapidly growing field of pharmacogenomics a 
solution to some of the “access issues” confronting the industry in the face 
of a proliferation of genomic patents.17  When owners of “complementary 
patents”18 aggregate their patents and license them as a group to third 
parties, the patent pool provides licensees a way to cut through the dense 
patent thicket and obtain licenses for patents most essential to their R&D.19  
Rather than rely on legislative, judicial, or regulatory intervention to 
reform proposals—all of which require much time and political 
gamesmanship—patent pools serve as a type of self-regulation of the 
                                                                                                                          
Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Issue Report on 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property (Apr. 17, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 
2007/04/ipreport.shtm. 
15 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 57 (2007), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
REPORT]. 
16 For an overview of patent pools, from the early pools of the nineteenth century to the present, 
see David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management 
Structures (Knowledge Ecology Int’l, Research Note 2007:6, 2007), available at http://www. 
keionline.org/misc-docs/ds-patentpools.pdf.   
17 Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices: Evidence and 
Policies, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), 1, 11–12 (2002), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf [hereinafter OECD REPORT].  
18 Complementary patents are those that can be used together and are not substitutes for each 
other.  See infra note 57. 
19 When entering a patent pool, patent holders should be able to retain ownership of their 
respective patents and license them non-exclusively to others.  Each patent holder should also retain the 
right to license their patents individually and independent of the patent pool.  See ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 85. 
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market that will not distort incentives to innovate.20  The private and public 
sectors are already experimenting with contractual means of obtaining 
access to genetic inventions (e.g., through various forms of cross-licensing 
arrangements); patent pools take this collaborative spirit one step further.   
Widespread adoption of pharmacogenomics is still several years 
away.21  Nevertheless, the biomedical community has demonstrated the 
collaborative spirit that is necessary through initiatives such as the 
Personalized Medicine Coalition,22 the SNP Consortium,23 and the 
proposed SARS patent pool.24  One area where patent pools could be 
exceptionally advantageous today is in the field of disease-specific 
diagnostics.25  As pharmacogenomics knowledge increases, such as 
understanding how specific polymorphisms in a patient’s genome correlate 
with drug metabolism, gene-based diagnostic testing (diagnostic testing) 
will become instrumental in early detection, prognosis, and tailored 
treatments of disease.  New diagnostic tests will be particularly important 
for the identification of candidate populations for drug development, 
clinical testing, and marketing.26  At the same time, much of this 
knowledge—particularly the genetic sequences and disease-causing 
mutations that must be known in order to develop the tests—will be 
patented.  Unsurprisingly, developing diagnostic tests for 
pharmacogenomics research will become more complex once firms have to 
negotiate multiple patents and cross-licensing agreements.27  These 
transaction costs could eventually make the R&D process too burdensome 
                                                                                                                          
20 OECD REPORT, supra note 17, at 31–32 (describing the advantages and disadvantages of 
various reform suggestions). 
21 Kelton, supra note 1, at 7 (“[T]he full promise of [pharmacogenomics] will not likely be 
realized for about 15 years . . . .”). 
22 The Personalized Medicine Coalition is an independent, non-profit group working to advance 
the understanding and adoption of personalized medicine.  See Personalized Medicine Coalition, 
http://www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
23 See infra Part V.A. 
24 See infra Part V.B. 
25 As Krattiger and Kowalski note: 
Unlike the general area of genomics, which is broadly diverse, diagnostic genetics is 
commercially focused on identified diseases with clear industry standards 
(mutations for analysis), and the players in the field share common goals.  Hence, 
patent pools . . . could have great utility in overcoming IP thickets that inhibit access 
to advances in genetic diagnostics. 
Krattiger & Kowalski, supra note 7, at 141. 
26 See COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN RESEARCH AND 
INNOVATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC 
AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 14 
(2005) (assessing the current and future impact of IP rights on genetic diagnostics and recommending, 
inter alia, that the NIH undertake a study of potential university, government, and industry 
arrangements for the pooling of genomic patents). 
27 Leslie Tucker, Pharmacogenomics: A Primer for Policymakers 21 (Nat’l Health Pol’y F., 
Background Paper, 2008), available at http://www.nhpf.org/library/background-papers/BP_ 
Pharmacogenomics_01-28-08.pdf.  
 1638 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1631 
and prohibitively expensive for any but the largest laboratories.28  Patent 
pools present an alternative to these high transaction costs and an 
opportunity to keep diagnostic tests affordable and accessible. 
This Note explores the possibility of creating patent pools in the 
emerging field of pharmacogenomics in order to cut through the patent 
thicket and ultimately advance the goal of bringing effective personalized 
medicine to market.  Specifically, this Note analyzes the significance of 
applying patent pools to genomic IP, arriving at the conclusion that patent 
pools are pro-competitive IP tools that can help facilitate the growth of 
new emerging technologies in well-defined commercial settings such as 
diagnostic testing.  Part II provides background on the pharmacogenomics 
industry and its related IP challenges.  Part II also considers how a multi-
tiered royalty schedule can offer a solution to the research exemption 
debate.  Part III explores the concept of patent pools and how they can 
resolve patent bottlenecks in order to allow new emerging technologies to 
advance.  Part IV examines some of the antitrust issues involved in patent 
pools and evaluates their pro- and anti-competitive effects.  Part V 
provides two anecdotal examples of collaborative strategies in genomic IP 
that have set a precedent for patent pools to work in pharmacogenomics.  
Part VI proposes how successful, pro-competitive patent pools could be 
used in the field of diagnostic testing.  This Note concludes by encouraging 
industry participants and policy makers to strongly consider the 
advantageous role patent pools can play in developing more appropriate, 
effective, and personalized medicine to health care providers and their 
patients. 
II.  PHARMACOGENOMICS AND IP CHALLENGES 
A.  Introduction to Pharmacogenomics 
Pharmacogenomics holds the promise that drugs might one day be 
tailor-made for individual patients, offering truly personalized medicine.  
This rapidly growing field examines the complicated patterns of genetic 
variation across a population and attempts to identify genetic differences 
that influence drug metabolism and response in order to correlate those 
differences with drug efficacy and safety information.29  Building off the 
Human Genome Project and the SNP Consortium, pharmacogenomics uses 
diagnostic testing to classify patients and diseases according to their 
genetic variations in order to determine which individual patients are 
predisposed to disease and how they will respond to therapeutic 
                                                                                                                          
28 Id. 
29 Khaleeli & Fernandez, supra note 2, at 86−87. 
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intervention.30  In other words, through diagnostic testing, health care 
providers can determine, before a prescription is written, whether a patient 
should take the drug, avoid the drug, or take it in an adjusted dosage.31  As 
opposed to the current “one size fits all” approach of modern 
pharmaceutical medicine, pharmacogenomics is based on the idea that 
human genetic variability accounts for some of the differences in how 
people interact with drugs and explains why not all patients who take the 
same drug respond similarly.32  In an era of rising health care costs, 
pharmacogenomics offers an opportunity to harness biotechnological and 
genomic knowledge in order to streamline health care delivery.33  But 
understanding the genetic variability in drug response is only part of the 
process of improving drug efficacy and safety and bringing personalized 
medicine to market. 
While there is great potential for pharmacogenomics to make 
significant contributions to the health care industry,34 there are numerous 
challenges and policy decisions that must be addressed before the science 
can progress.  Simply stated, the key limitation to the widespread use of 
pharmacogenomics is cost.  A major contributor is the transaction costs 
associated with licensing and securing IP rights for the development of 
new diagnostic tests, research tools, methods, and standards for drug 
dosage and treatment schedules.35  For pharmacogenomics to become 
                                                                                                                          
30 Tucker, supra note 27, at 3. 
31 Diagnostics will also be useful in identifying those patients who are likely to suffer an adverse 
reaction from a particular medication.  PCAST REPORT, supra note 1, at 1; see also PERSONALIZED 
MEDICINE COALITION, THE CASE FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 4 (2006) (citation omitted), available 
at http://www.ageofpersonalizedmedicine.org/objects/pdfs/TheCaseforPersonalizedMedicine_11_13. 
pdf (“Studies estimate that over 2 million serious adverse drug reactions (ADRs) occur annually in the 
United States, causing as many as 137,000 deaths . . . . Some of these deaths could be prevented by 
testing individuals for genetic variations indicating their susceptibility to toxic reactions.”).  
32 Gary E. Marchant, Personalized Medicine and the Law, AZ ATT’Y, October 2007, at 12, 13–14. 
33 Scientists also hope that pharmacogenomics will reduce the time and cost of drug development 
by requiring smaller and fewer clinical trials, generating more consistent trial results, and making it 
easier to gain FDA approval.  Khaleeli & Fernandez, supra note 2, at 87–88. 
34 See, e.g., PERSONALIZED MEDICINE COALITION, supra note 31, at 3–7 (listing several benefits 
of personalized medicine); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PERSONALIZED MEDICINE, THE EMERGING 
PHARMACOGENOMICS REVOLUTION 12–19 (2005), available at http://www.pwc.com/techforecast/pdfs/ 
pharmaco-wb-x.pdf (discussing the “promise of pharmacogenomics”).  
35 Khaleeli & Fernandez, supra note 2, at 87.  Other challenges to the progress of 
pharmacogenomics include narrowing down and categorizing single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) 
in order to identify closely associated polymorphisms that tend to occur in clusters and thus serve as 
accurate genetic markers for disease.  Id.  This process, known as haplotyping, is currently being 
coordinated through the International HapMap Project.  International HapMap Project, 
http://www.hapmap.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).  The process of deciphering which combinations 
of SNPs account for what biological effects is a long and arduous task, considering that amidst the 
combination of three billion DNA bases (coding for roughly 22,000 genes) that make up the human 
genome, there are an estimated ten million SNPs.  Tucker, supra note 27, at 8.  Additionally, various 
other tools are needed for collecting, standardizing, and interpreting the massive amount of data 
generated by pharmacogenomics studies, many of which are made publicly available through databases 
such as the Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics Knowledge Base and the SNP Consortium.  
Pharmacogenomics Knowledge Base, http://www.pharmgkb.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
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practicable, the transaction costs involved need to be reduced so that 
companies have a reasonable chance of a return on their investment.  
Without this incentive to compete in the marketplace, prohibitive 
transaction costs threaten to stifle innovation and limit the success that 
many people hope pharmacogenomics will bring. 
Diagnostic testing is one area where pharmacogenomic knowledge is 
especially advantageous and where patent pools can offer an efficient 
alternative to an increasingly complex IP environment.  Genetic diseases 
can be caused by a variety of mutations in one gene, or by one or more 
mutations in several genes.36  In developing diagnostic tests, not only is it 
critical to determine which mutations should be used as markers for 
diagnosing the disease, but it is also important to determine how many 
different parties hold the patents on those genetic sequences and causative 
mutations that would necessarily be infringed in the development of a new 
diagnostic product.37  Determining which patents are most relevant and 
obtaining licenses for each can be a very time-consuming and expensive 
process.  This is particularly true considering the fact that scientific 
research is more complicated than a mere linear progression, since “one 
firm’s research tool may be another firm’s end product.”38  Discovery and 
innovation have become “progressively more dependent on access to a 
common pool of accumulated scientific knowledge” that, if inaccessible, 
could thwart future advancements in the field.39  In these situations, a 
patent pool, consisting of the essential genomic patents for a particular 
genetic disease, could help surmount the patent thicket and render the 
proprietary technologies more accessible for use in developing a diagnostic 
test that ultimately advances therapeutic options.40 
B.  Are IP Rights Stifling Innovation?  The Theory of the Anticommons and 
the Patent Thicket 
Thousands of patents have been granted for specific genes, gene 
fragments, mutations, genetic testing methods, and other research tools.41  
In fact, one study revealed that approximately twenty percent of the genes 
in the human genome, particularly those with medical relevance, are 
                                                                                                                          
36 Birgit Verbeure et al., Patent Pools and Diagnostic Testing, 24 TRENDS IN BIOTECH. 115, 118 
(2006). 
37 Ted J. Ebersole et al., Patent Pools as a Solution to the Licensing Problems of Diagnostic 
Genetics, 17 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 6, 6 (2005). 
38 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene Patenting 
Controversy, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 633, 647 n.51 (1994); see also Clarisa Long, Patents and Cumulative 
Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 229, 230 (2000).     
39 Long, supra note 38, at 234–35. 
40 Verbeure et al., supra note 36, at 118. 
41 Burk & Lemley, supra note 13, at 1625–26. 
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patented.42  Patents are important to ensure investors a limited monopoly 
on their work, during which they can hope to recoup their investment in 
R&D.  By allowing a licensee to use the patented invention, patent holders 
can promote the dissemination of technology within an industry.43  At the 
same time, high transaction costs required to negotiate complex licensing 
agreements, as well as difficulties in determining which patents are 
essential to a technology (and thus must be licensed), can present 
disincentives to investing in biomedical research.  Some commentators, 
therefore, argue that the proliferation of patents in biomedical research 
raises concerns about an “anticommons” problem as well as an 
increasingly treacherous “patent thicket.”44 
According to the anticommons theory, when numerous property 
owners hold exclusionary rights over a scarce resource, the result is an 
underutilization of the resource.45  Applied to biomedical research, the 
anticommons theory warns that granting too many competing patent rights 
could deter innovation by preventing useful products from entering the 
market when making those products requires permission to use many 
different inventions.46  Response to the anticommons theory has been 
varied, however, with some commentators—the “optimists”—focusing on 
the integration of disparate property rights where patent holders establish 
“formal and informal mechanisms” to lower costs.47  Moreover, the threat 
of an anticommons in biomedical research seems largely anecdotal, as 
empirical research has shown that the protection of IP rights has not led to 
breakdowns in negotiations, significantly delayed biomedical research, or 
                                                                                                                          
42 Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 
SCIENCE 239, 239 (2005).  While large segments of the human genome are unpatented, “some genes 
have up to 20 patents asserting rights to various gene uses . . . including diagnostic uses.”  Id.  
43 The technical information that is disclosed when a patent is issued can be instrumental in 
furthering innovation by others.  Cynthia M. Ho, Who Deserves the Patent Pot of Gold?: An Inquiry 
into the Proper Inventorship of Patent-Based Discoveries, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 185, 190 
(2004).  A patent holder’s decision to grant licenses to third parties makes the invention even more 
accessible. 
44 Shapiro, supra note 12, at 124. 
45 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).    
46 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 699 (1998) (“Each upstream patent allows its owner to set up 
another tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of 
downstream biomedical innovation.”); see also Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches 
Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 192–94 (2001) (arguing that upstream patents in biotechnology could lead to 
bargaining breakdown and impede innovation). 
47 Merges, supra note 10, at 128–29.  As an example of one of these formal “institutions,” Merges 
looks at the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), a collective rights 
organization which reduces transaction costs by gathering together a large number of musical 
composition copyrights, issuing a “blanket license” for all songs in its repertoire, and distributing a 
share of the licensing fees as royalty payments to individual copyright holders.  Id. 
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otherwise harmed innovation.48  Indeed, experience has shown that firms 
and research entities often seek out “‘working solutions’ which allow them 
to continue to innovate relatively unimpeded.”49  Therefore, while 
researchers may find it costly and time-consuming to negotiate licensing 
agreements, recent research suggests that innovation has not suffered 
despite the threat of an anticommons.50  Notwithstanding these findings, 
another study has indicated that the threat of an anticommons persists 
when clinicians and research laboratories stop developing and performing 
diagnostic tests due to patents, licensing restrictions, and related 
transaction costs.51 
C.  The “Research Use” Exemption Dilemma and a Multi-Tiered Royalty 
Schedule Solution 
Closely related to anticommons and patent thicket concerns is the issue 
of a “research use” exemption for the purpose of non-commercial 
research.52  The research use exemption provides an affirmative defense 
against patent infringement liability where the alleged infringer is using the 
patented invention for non-commercial research purposes.53  Recent case 
law, however, has dramatically limited the scope of the research use 
exemption.54  Concerned that without this common law protection, patents 
                                                                                                                          
48 Stifling or Stimulating—The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of E. Jonathan Soderstrom, Managing Director, Office of Cooperative 
Research, Yale University) (citing John P. Walsh et al., View From the Bench: Patents and Material 
Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2002–03 (2005)), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/pdf/Soderstrom071030.pdf. Other empirical evidence has demonstrated that the technology 
transfer and licensing behavior of academic institutions often allow for collaboration and sharing of 
DNA-based inventions.  Id. (citing Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US 
Academic Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31, 31 (2006)). 
49 OECD REPORT, supra note 17, at 50. 
50 John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, 
in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 331–36 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. 
Merrill eds., 2003) (concluding innovation has not been impeded but cautioning “ongoing scrutiny is 
warranted”). 
51 Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic 
Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003) (finding that twenty-five percent of U.S. 
clinical laboratory directors surveyed stopped performing diagnostic tests due to patents and licenses, 
and fifty-three percent decided not to develop or perform a diagnostic test because of a patent). 
52 A research use exemption for patented inventions generally allows non-commercial researchers 
to use an invention without infringing the rights of the patent holder.  Without an exemption, 
universities and non-profit research organizations may be sued for patent infringement if they use the 
patented invention without first obtaining a license.  The term “experimental” is often used 
interchangeably with “research” for these types of exemptions. 
53 This common law doctrine was originally articulated by Justice Story in Whittemore v. Cutter, 
29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (“[I]t could never have been the intention of 
the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, 
or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”). 
54 See, e.g., Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205–08 (2005) (holding 
that the use of patented compounds in preclinical studies is protected under 35 U.S.C § 271(e)(1) as 
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on research tools will have adverse effects on innovation, a number of 
commentators have called for a statutory experimental use exemption from 
patent infringement liability so that research can proceed unimpeded.55  
Despite these proposals from the legal community, there has been little 
movement in terms of actual legislation.  That said, there are 
alternativesaside from legislative actionthat could serve the same 
purpose by allowing research institutions to access patented technology 
without the same financial burdens as those firms utilizing the technology 
for purely commercial purposes.  A patent pool with a multi-tiered royalty 
schedule could serve this purpose.  For instance, a patent pool for 
diagnostic testing would not require legislation to extend research and 
clinical use incentives to licensees.  Through a multi-tiered royalty 
schedule, the patent pool could allow clinicians and non-commercial 
research entities to purchase patent portfolio licenses at a reduced rate, 
while maintaining normal license rates for commercial users. 
III.  SOLUTION: PATENT POOLS 
A.  Introduction to Patent Pools 
A patent pool is a voluntary arrangement among multiple patent 
holders to aggregate their patents.56  While there are different forms of 
patent pools, these arrangements fundamentally consist of the interchange 
of rights to essential patents by a number of patent holders (i.e., the pooled 
patents are available to each member of the pool), as well as pre-
                                                                                                                          
long as the research is done for the purposes of submitting the pharmaceutical for FDA regulatory 
approval); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (indicating that the “very 
narrow and strictly limited” research exemption applies only to acts that are “solely for amusement, to 
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”). 
55 See generally Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for 
an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents 
and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); 
Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent 
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Katherine J. Strandburg, 
What Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004).  
It is worth noting, however, that these concerns only become problematic if patent holders refuse to 
license their inventions.  If patent pools containing research tools are widely adopted, there is no issue 
since patent holders are clearly willing to commercialize and license their inventions.  Mueller, supra, 
at 15. 
56 Merges, supra note 10, at 129.  In other words, a patent pool is “the aggregation of intellectual 
property rights which are the subject of cross-licensing, whether they are transferred directly by [a] 
patentee to [a] licensee or through some medium, such as a joint venture, set up specifically to 
administer the patent pool.”  Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Address to the Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n: Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, 3 n.3 (May 2, 
1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1118.pdf [hereinafter Klein Address] 
(noting that in United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 313 n.24 (1948), the Supreme Court 
stated that the term “patent pool” is not a term of art). 
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determined standard licensing terms to third parties.57   The pool may have 
a licensing entity that administers the patent pool and issues licenses to 
third parties on a nondiscriminatory basis; however, individual pool 
members are typically free to negotiate licenses directly with licensees, 
independent of the pool. 
Firms typically organize patent pools within established, technology-
intensive industries in order to regularize the frequent interactions between 
different IP rights owners where rights are scattered amongst several 
owners and bundling is most efficient.58  As an example of what Robert P. 
Merges refers to as a “collective rights organization,” patent pools 
accommodate consistent innovative growth in an IP-dominated field.59  
Potential members are attracted to join a patent pool for what it offers: 
decreased transaction costs, the freedom to operate in a technology field 
for commercial and research purposes, and a reliable royalty income 
stream generated from member and nonmember licensees.60  Interested 
parties are then able “to gather all the necessary tools to practice a certain 
technology in one place, e.g., ‘one-stop shopping,’ rather than obtaining 
licenses from each patent holder individually.”61  By combining “far-flung 
                                                                                                                          
57 Krattiger & Kowlaski, supra note 7, at 137.  A key difference between a patent pool and a 
cross-licensing agreement between two patent holders is that a patent pool “explicitly allows for 
(package) licensing to third parties.”  Patrick Gaulé, Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?, 2 
INNOVATION STRATEGY TODAY 123, 124 (2006), available at http://www.biodevelopments.org/ 
innovation/ist5.pdf.  Ebersole et al. provide clear definitions of these different types of patents: 
Critical to the structuring and implementing of patent pools are the definitions 
of complementary, competing, blocking, and essential patents.  Complementary 
patents are for “technologies that may be used together, and not substitutes for 
each other.”  Two different patents each on a different SNP for the same disease 
would be complementary.  Competing patents cover technologies that substitute 
for each other.  A patent on a SNP and another one on an antibody might be 
competing technologies to diagnose the same disease.  A blocking patent “block[s] 
another if [the latter] can not be practiced without infringing on the basic patent.”  
A patent on an isolated gene and all its fragments might be blocking to all genetic 
testing for a disease.  Essential patents have been defined as ones having “no 
technical alternative” and useful “only in conjunction with other pooled patents.”  
An example would be a patent on the critical SNP or the gene correlated to the 
disease. 
Ebersole et al., supra note 37, at 8 (internal citations omitted). 
58 Merges, supra note 10, at 130.  “Pools can comprise as few as two patents, or as many as 
hundreds.”  Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 
367–68 (1999).  The Hartford-Empire pool, for example, comprised over 600 patents.  Hartford-Empire 
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 400 (1945). 
59 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1340–42 (1996) (characterizing a patent pool 
as a private transactional mechanism that requires a voluntary assumption of liability rules so as to 
regularize technology transactions). 
60 Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: 
Hearing on Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing Before the Fed. Trade Commission and Dep’t of Justice, 
108th Cong. 4 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020417lawrencemsung1.pdf 
(statement of Lawrence M. Sung, Assistant Prof. of L., Univ. Md.) [hereinafter Sung Testimony]. 
61 Press Release, U.S. Pat & Trademark Off., USPTO Issues White Paper on Patent Pooling (Jan. 
19, 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/01-06.htm. 
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property rights into useable bundles,” patent pools overcome the threat of 
an anticommons and preserve the incentives that accompany IP rights.62  
For emerging technologies such as pharmacogenomics, with genetic 
information representing an “industry standard” analogous to those in the 
electronics and telecommunications areas, “the landscape of increasing 
patent protection to this genetic material favors the voluntary entry of 
biotechnology industry members into patent pooling arrangements.”63  
Moreover, introducing a multi-tiered royalty schedule to these patent 
pools, in which different types of IP rights users (i.e., commercial versus 
purely research-focused) pay different fees to access the pooled 
technologies, can further enhance the attractiveness of patent pools for 
pharmacogenomics. 
B.  Patent Pools in Biotechnology 
Since the mid-1980s, technological advances have both created 
tremendous excitement about the potential for genomic innovation as well 
as elicited concern on the part of public and private research entities about 
how to protect and profit from their inventions.64  The completion of the 
Human Genome Project embodied these competing interests and sparked a 
public debate: What is the patentability of genetic inventions and how can 
society benefit from such technology?65  A number of scientists, ethicists, 
and policy makers voiced concern that when genetic information is 
patented, “researchers will no longer have free access to the information 
and materials necessary to perform biological research.”66  The sheer size 
of the biotechnology and genomics industries and the substantial resources 
needed to develop any significant finding demand collaboration.  If 
pharmacogenomics is to advance efficiently, patent holders and researchers 
                                                                                                                          
62 Merges, supra note 10, at 129.  Applying conventional economic principles, Merges explains 
that “[w]ith ‘gains from trade’ to be had, the parties figure out a deal that makes everyone better off. . . 
. [A patent pool] creates a mechanism that lowers the average cost of transaction enough to make 
ongoing exchange worthwhile.”  Id. at 129–30. 
63 Sung Testimony, supra note 60, at 5. 
64 Jeanne Clark et al., Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology 
Patents? 2 (U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ 
dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf. 
65 As Clark et al. explained: 
Part of the public concern lies in the corporate utilization of information from 
several genome projects that have been placed in the public domain.  Companies 
have used this information in their own proprietary research, thereby, capitalizing on 
publicly funded efforts and removing further developments of such efforts from the 
public domain.  There is great consternation that some private concerns are 
attempting to reap benefits from patented technologies that would not have been 
possible without publicly funded research, such as the Human Genome Project. 
Id. at 2–3.  
66 Id. at 3.  A significant concern related to biotechnology patents is the removal of valuable 
research resources from the public domain.  Id. 
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will need to pool their collective resources and knowledge. 
Recognizing the importance of the biotechnology industry to the 
American economy, as well as the industry’s dependence on patent 
protection in order to maintain its viability, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) released a White Paper in 2000 examining the 
potential implications of patent pools in biotechnology.67  In particular, the 
USPTO was interested in addressing the challenges many firms face in 
licensing multiple patents in order to access specific biotechnology 
products and processes.68  What resulted, both in the White Paper and in 
subsequent research, was a growing awareness of the significant benefits 
that genomic patent pools offer to scientific understanding and 
technological advancement. 
C.  Benefits of Patent Pools 
Patent pools provide pro-competitive benefits by reducing transaction 
costs, avoiding infringement litigation, clearing blocking patents, 
eliminating problems associated with royalty stacking, distributing risks, 
and promoting the dissemination of technological information.69  When 
deciding to join a patent pool, a patent holder will consider whether the 
economic, legal, and practical benefits of such collective rights 
arrangements will outweigh the costs of membership.70  For an emerging 
field such as pharmacogenomics, the opportunity to affordably and 
efficiently access information and technology through a reasonably priced 
patent pool license will enhance the commercial potential for innovation.71  
This Section describes the various benefits of patent pools. 
1.  Patent Pools Reduce Transaction Costs 
When a firm requires licenses to a number of patents, held by a 
number of different firms, patent pooling arrangements create substantial 
efficiencies by reducing the transaction costs of multiple licensing 
negotiations.72  Rather than negotiating separate licenses with each patent 
                                                                                                                          
67 Press Release, U.S. Pat & Trademark Off., supra note 61. 
68 Id.   
69 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
0558.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST–IP GUIDELINES].  The dissemination of technological information 
relates to trade secrets, which often get bundled with patents when patent holders contribute their 
intellectual property rights to a pool. 
70 Often, this cost-benefit analysis will evaluate the potential long-term implications of joining the 
patent pool, since many of the economic benefits would likely occur in the future (e.g., royalty rates, 
dissemination of technical information, etc.).  Clark et al. assert that the re-emergence of patent pools in 
the late 1990s, suggest that the social and economic benefits of patent pools outweigh their costs.  Clark 
et al., supra note 64, at 8. 
71 Clark et al., supra note 64, at 9. 
72 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 57. 
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owner, a firm seeking to access a collection of technologies can do so 
through the less costly alternative of obtaining a patent pool license.73  As 
with other forms of collective rights organizations, the basic economic 
rationale is that patent pools resolve transactional bottlenecks.  That is, 
they offer licenses at independently-determined rates so as to minimize the 
length of time and the hassle of exchanging rights through a series of 
individual licensing deals.74  A patent pool’s simplified approach to 
licensing, from the licensee’s perspective, can facilitate more rapid 
development and adoption of new technologies than could be achieved 
through individual cross-licensing alone.75   These transaction cost savings 
are particularly attractive for small biotechnology firms lacking significant 
resources for negotiating and acquiring licenses from a vast arrangement of 
patent holders.      
2.  Patent Pools Reduce Enforcement Costs  
Patent pools are also a highly efficient way of reducing enforcement 
costs and resolving legal conflicts involving potential patent infringement 
cases.76  Patent infringement litigation requires considerable time and 
money.  In addition, the inherent uncertainty of patent litigation 
compounds the problem, as litigants can sometimes face judges and juries 
ill-equipped to handle complex technical disputes.77  Just as lower 
transaction costs are attractive to both patent holders and licensees, 
lowered enforcement costs can provide such a strong incentive that it 
makes sense for patent holders to join the pool.78    
In some instances, firms with limited resources may opt for an 
alternative strategy and try to determine which infringed patents are the 
most likely to be litigated, obtain only those licenses, and accept the risk of 
potential infringement litigation from the others.  Or, they may simply 
decide not to obtain any licenses.79  These risky alternatives increase the 
chances of costly and uncertain patent infringement litigation as well as 
harm for patent holders who would not only lose royalty revenue, but 
would also have to constantly monitor the field for potential infringers.  
Patent pools limit these enforcement costs and related uncertainties, thus 
                                                                                                                          
73 Id. at 65.   
74 Merges, supra note 10, at 131–33. 
75 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 65. 
76 Id.  
77 Carlson, supra note 58, at 380. 
78 Merges, supra note 10, at 132. 
79 Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: J. 
Hearing on Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing Before the Fed. Trade Commission and Dep’t of Justice, 
108th Cong. 7 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020417jamesjkulbaski.pdf 
(statement of James J. Kulbaski, Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier & Neustadt, P.C.) [hereinafter 
Kulbaski Testimony]. 
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making these pools very attractive to potential members and licensees 
alike. 
3.  Patent Pools Overcome Problems Associated with Blocking and 
Stacking Patents 
The problem of “blocking patents” can significantly disrupt the 
commercialization of new technology.80  This phenomenon occurs when 
numerous patents have claims that overlap each other such that the 
invention claimed on one patent cannot be practiced without necessarily 
infringing the claims of another patent.81  While the allowance of 
improvement patents provides incentives to innovate, inevitable legal 
entanglements can result when rival patentees are given “the right to 
exclude each other from making, using, or selling the patented 
technology.”82  In biotechnology, firms often encounter blocking patents as 
they develop new products that require access to a multitude of patents on 
nucleic acids, genes, and DNA fragments.83   
Pioneer technologies, as exemplified by airplanes in the early 1900s 
and pharmacogenomics today, frequently face problems associated with 
blocking patents, which threaten the development of new commercial 
products.84  While blocking patents are proof of technological 
advancement, without some form of cooperative agreement between the 
patentees, blocking patents can frustrate the patent system and complicate 
                                                                                                                          
80 Clark et al., supra note 64, at 8.   
81 Merges provides the following explanation of how blocking patents arise: 
Two patents are said to block each other when one patentee has a broad patent on 
an invention and another has a narrower patent on some improved feature of that 
invention.  The broad patent is said to “dominate” the narrower one.  In such a 
situation, the holder of the narrower (subservient) patent cannot practice her 
invention without a license from the holder of the dominant patent.  At the same 
time, the holder of the dominant patent cannot practice the particular improved 
feature claimed in the narrower patent without a license. 
Robert P. Merges, A Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents: Biotechnology as an 
Example, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 878, 878–79 (1991). 
82 Carlson, supra note 58, at 379. 
83 To illustrate this point, suppose Firm A invents Method X for detecting a particular mutation on 
a particular gene that is highly correlated with Alzheimer’s disease.  Firm A patents Method X and 
holds a limited monopoly on that invention.  Firm B then invents a way to do Method X for 1/100th the 
cost and is granted an improvement patent (as compared to Firm A’s basic patent).  A license to use 
Firm B’s improvement patent, however, will not be useful without a license to use Firm A’s basic 
patent.  Likewise, a license to use Firm A’s basic patent on Method X will not be useful without a 
license to use Firm B’s improvement patent.  Therefore, if Firm C wants to use Method X’s 
technology, it must receive licenses from both Firm A and Firm B.  Without those licenses, Firm C is 
“blocked” from practicing the technology.  See, e.g., Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, 
Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809–10 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (providing a hypothetical illustration of the use of a 
blocking patent). 
84 For a review of the Wright-Curtiss blocking patents dispute in the airplane industry, and the 
resulting patent pool, see George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent 
Agreement, 31 J.L. & ECON. 227, 230–35 (1988).  See generally Harry T. Dykman, Patent Licensing 
Within the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA), 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 646 (1964). 
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licensing arrangements.  Courts have recognized this dilemma and have 
identified the blocking patents problem as a justification for patent pools.85   
Another important feature of patent pools is that they can eliminate 
royalty stacking and mitigate further problems that often occur when 
multiple patent holders individually negotiate licenses.86  Royalty stacking 
occurs in the absence of pooled licensing arrangements, where multiple 
patents overlap a technology, forcing licensees to “bear multiple patent 
burdens.”87  Depending upon the demands of the individual patent holders, 
this buildup of licensing fees can increase costs and decrease commercial 
profitability of the end product.88  As a result, royalty stacking can result in 
an inefficiently low use of a technology, magnify the monopoly burden of 
the patent system, and even cause certain products not to be produced at 
all.89  Similarly, additional problems can arise when licensees need 
multiple complementary patent licenses and patent holders strategically 
delay license negotiations so as to advantageously position themselves as 
the last bidding seller.90  This “hold-out” scenario results in a higher 
royalty payment burden than if all the blocking patents are licensed as a 
package and a single royalty is required to access all the pooled patents.91  
But when patent holders form patent pools, licensees can access all the 
essential patents required for the production of a certain technology at a 
lower, more reasonable royalty rate than if each license fee were 
independently negotiated.92  Therefore, patent pools can be invaluable to 
firms trying to avoid the cost-prohibitiveness of entering into a new 
emerging field, particularly one involving pioneer patents. 
4.  Patent Pools Distribute Risks Among Members   
Another efficiency gained in the formation of a patent pool is the 
distribution of risks.93  The sharing of royalties among the various pool 
members increases the likelihood that each patent holder will be able to 
recover some, if not all, of its R&D costs.94  By creating a mechanism for a 
                                                                                                                          
85 Carlson, supra note 58, at 379 (citing Standard Oil Co., v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 
(1931); Int’l Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1964)). 
86 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 57. 
87 Id. at 61; Shapiro, supra note 12, at 124. 
88 Shapiro, supra note 12, at 124. 
89 Id. 
90 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 64–65 n.40 (citing Robert P. Merges, 
Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 
CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1298 n.9 (1996)). 
91 Id. at 65; Shapiro, supra note 12, at 123–24 (describing Cournot’s theory of complements and 
hold-out scenario as providing strong support for the adoption of patent pools). 
92 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 61.    
93 Clark et al., supra note 64, at 9. 
94 Id.  Royalty rate setting is often negotiated upfront when the patent pool is first formed, and 
there are several options regarding how to spread the royalty payments amongst the pool members.  Id.  
For example, all essential patents in a patent pool can be deemed equal in value, with royalties shared 
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patent holder to share the risks associated with technology ventures, patent 
pools provide incentives to collaborate and innovate.  The ability to recoup 
investments and distribute the risks of developing new technologies is 
particularly attractive in the biotechnology industry, where risks of failure 
are high, as are the potential payoffs.95   
5.  Patent Pools Facilitate Exchange of Non-Patented Technical 
Information   
In addition to the above-mentioned legal and economic efficiencies, 
patent pools can also institutionalize the exchange of non-patented 
technical information.96  Without the mechanism of a patent pool, much of 
this technical information related to the patented technology would be kept 
a trade secret.97  This benefit is particularly advantageous for smaller 
companies—such as those populating the biotechnology industry—because 
the information and insight exchanged through participation in a patent 
pool can accelerate the spread of technical knowledge “to the far corners of 
the industry.”98  Patent pools can also facilitate the crucial task of creating 
a framework for developing an industry standard.99  Thus, the advantages 
of patent pools extend “far beyond a cessation of patent hostilities,”100 
becoming “critically important mechanisms for enabling widespread use of 
new technologies . . . .”101 
IV.  PROTECTING COMPETITION AND PROMOTING INNOVATION: ARE 
PATENT POOLS ANTICOMPETITIVE? 
Commentators have noted a tension between the seemingly divergent 
policy goals of IP and antitrust law, with the courts’ deference to each of 
                                                                                                                          
equally.  Id.  Alternatively, a pool could engage in more complex calculations of the valuation of each 
participating patent and structure its royalty payment scheme accordingly.   
95 Carlson, supra note 58, at 381–82. 
96 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 65. 
97 Verbeure et al., supra note 36, at 116. 
98 Merges, supra note 10, at 139 n.66 and accompanying text (citing WILLIAM GREENLEAF, 
MONOPOLY ON WHEELS 246 (1961)); see OECD REPORT, supra note 17, at 51–52 (explaining that the 
biotechnology industry often relies on small to medium-sized specialist companies to perform the early 
exploratory stages of drug development). 
99 See Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: 
J. Hearing on Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing Before the Fed. Trade Commission and Dep’t of 
Justice, 108th Cong. (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020417barynfuta.pdf 
(statement of Baryn Futa, Manager & CEO, MPEG LA, LLC) [hereinafter Futa Testimony] (describing 
the MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio for digital compression technology and its success in playing a large role 
in the worldwide utility of the MPEG-2 technology standard). 
100 Merges, supra note 10, at 139. 
101 Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: J. 
Hearing on Economic and Other Perspectives on Patent Standards and Procedures Before the Fed. 
Trade Comm’n and Dep’t of Justice, 108th Cong. 700 (2003) (transcript for Feb. 28, 2002), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228ftc.pdf [hereinafter Competition and Intellectual Property 
Law Transcript]. 
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these bodies of law vacillating throughout the twentieth century.102  
Intellectual property laws establish exclusive property rights—in the form 
of limited monopolies—for the creators of new and useful products while, 
conversely, the antitrust laws prohibit certain actions that may restrict or 
harm competition.103  Notwithstanding this apparent contradiction, IP law 
and federal antitrust regulation are actually complementary, as both are 
“aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”104 
One area where the tension between IP and antitrust laws has been 
particularly acute is in the formation of patent pools.  In the early 1900s, 
the Supreme Court gave great deference to the policy goals of IP laws, 
finding much of patent law immune from antitrust scrutiny.105  With the 
1912 decision in Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States,106 
however, the Court began to limit the absolute freedom of patentees to 
form collusive patent pools, a trend which dominated until the mid-1900s.  
In Standard Sanitary, manufacturers of enameled ironware (e.g., bath tubs, 
sinks, and drinking fountains), controlling eighty-five percent of the 
relevant market, “entered into and engaged in a combination and 
conspiracy to restrain such trade and commerce” by forming a combination 
of patents with heavy restrictions on participants.107  According to the 
Court, collusive agreements such as these “clearly . . . transcended what 
was necessary to protect the use of the patent or the monopoly which the 
[patent] law conferred upon it,” and, thus, violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act108 as an unreasonable restraint on trade.109  Likewise, in 
1945, the Supreme Court disbanded a collusive glass manufacturing patent 
pool which, in the words of Justice Black, represented a “completely 
successful economic tyranny.”110  In Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 
a cartel of major glass manufacturers entered into a scheme to monopolize 
glass-making in the United States by pooling together over 800 patents and 
                                                                                                                          
102 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 58, at 360.  
103 ANTITRUST–IP GUIDELINES, supra note 69 at § 1.0. 
104 Clark et al., supra note 64, at 5 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 
1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: 
From Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 3 (2000) (stating that since joining the FTC in 1997, 
Commissioner Anthony found that “the goals of intellectual property and antitrust law are not mutually 
exclusive and, in fact, are quite similar”). 
105 In E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., for example, the Court found that a patent pool 
engaging in outright price fixing with no apparent transfer of technology merited immunity from 
antitrust scrutiny.  186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (“[T]he general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of 
rights under the patent laws of the United States.”); see also Anthony, supra note 104, at 5.  
106 Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912). 
107 Id. at 35.  
108 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
109 Standard Sanitary, 226 U.S. at 48.  
110 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 436 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting in part).  
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effectively controlling the entire glass-making industry.111  The Court held 
that the parties had violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act112 and 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act113 by regulating and suppressing 
competition.114 
Such hostility toward the potentially collusive effects of patent pools 
continued through the middle of the twentieth century, but began to lessen 
when the Court recognized that IP and antitrust laws could co-exist.115  In 
the 1960s and 1970s, the Department of Justice (DOJ) devised a policy for 
the evaluation of patent licensing practices, enumerating nine specific 
licensing practices that it viewed as per se violations of antitrust law, and 
implicitly approving practices that did not violate these “Nine No No’s.”116  
Since then, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the DOJ have begun 
to recognize the interconnected relationship between antitrust law and IP 
rights.117  Moreover, these agencies have acknowledged that patent pools 
can have significant pro-competitive effects that enable businesses to 
survive in our current era of rapid technological innovation.118  
A.  Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
In 1995, the FTC and the DOJ jointly issued Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (Antitrust-IP Guidelines), a 
                                                                                                                          
111 Id. at 400.  Specifically, the members of the pool were found to have discouraged new 
inventions of glass making machinery, suppressed competition in the manufacture and sale or licensing 
of glass-making machinery, and employed a system of restricted licensing in order to further suppress 
competition and fix prices.  Id.  “The result was that 94% of the glass containers manufactured in this 
country on feeders and formers were made on machinery licensed under the pooled patents.”  Id. 
112 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006) (forbidding monopolies and contracts that operate “in restraint of 
trade or commerce”). 
113 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006) (outlawing exclusive dealings and tying contracts that “substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly”). 
114 Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 406–07. 
115 Anthony, supra note 104, at 5. 
116 Id.  The “Nine No-No’s” include the following licensing practices: tying arrangements; 
grantback provisions; vertical distribution restraints; restricting a licensee’s freedom to deal in products 
or services outside the scope of the patent; a licensor’s agreement not to grant further licenses; 
mandatory package licensing; requiring a licensee to pay royalties in an amount not reasonably related 
to the licensee’s sales of products covered by the patent; restrictions on a licensee’s use of a product 
made by the use of a patented process; and requiring a licensee to adhere to any specified or minimum 
price with respect to the resale of the licensed products.  See Bruce B. Wilson, Special Assistant to the 
Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks before the Fourth New 
England Antitrust Conference: Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, 
Price and Quantity Restrictions (Nov. 6, 1970), reprinted in ANTITRUST PRIMER: PATENTS, 
FRANCHISING, TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS 11, 12–14 (Sara-Ann Sanders ed., 1970) (describing these 
policies).  
117 Anthony, supra note 104, at 7 (“[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may 
seem, at first glance, wholly at odds.  However, the two bodies of law are complementary . . . .”) 
(quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F. 2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 
ANTITRUST–IP GUIDELINES, supra note 69, § 1.0. 
118 Clark et al., supra note 64, at 5–6.   
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comprehensive set of federal guidelines that specifically addressed cross-
licensing and patent pooling arrangements.119  The Antitrust-IP Guidelines 
expressly state that pooling arrangements are pro-competitive when they 
integrate complementary technologies, reduce transaction costs, clear 
blocking patents, avoid costly patent infringement litigation, and promote 
the dissemination of technology.120  Such pooling arrangements, however, 
risk heightened antitrust scrutiny if they significantly diminish competition 
in the relevant market.121  Anticompetitive effects may also occur if the 
pooling arrangement “deters or discourages participants from engaging in 
research and development, thus retarding innovation.”122  The Antitrust-IP 
Guidelines also recognize that patent pools can have pro-competitive 
benefits “by exploiting economies of scale and integrating complementary 
capabilities of the pool members.”123  
By outlining the standards with which the FTC and the DOJ would 
evaluate the legality of patent pools, the two agencies articulated a policy 
that recognized a balancing of the pro-competitive and anti-competitive 
effects of pooling IP rights.  Shortly after the release of the Antitrust–IP 
Guidelines, both the FTC and the DOJ applied this analysis to proposals 
for new patent pools, specifically in the computer and digital technology 
industries.124  In their reviews, the DOJ examined the proposed license 
pooling arrangements by asking two principal questions: (1) whether the 
patent pool “is likely to integrate complementary patent rights” and (2) 
“whether the resulting competitive benefits are likely to be outweighed by 
                                                                                                                          
119 See generally ANTITRUST–IP GUIDELINES, supra note 69. 
120 Id. at 28. 
121 Id. at 28. 
122 Id. at 29.  The Antitrust–IP Guidelines provide the example of a pooling arrangement that 
involves compulsory licensing for future technologies.  A compulsory licensing requirement may 
reduce the incentives of the pool’s members to engage in R&D due to the fear of other members free 
riding on their accomplishments.  Id.  Such an arrangement, however, is likely to be anticompetitive 
“only when [it] includes a large fraction of the potential research and development in an innovation 
market.”  Id.   
123 Id.   
124 See, e.g., Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf [hereinafter MPEG-2 Review Letter] 
(approving a patent pool for the MPEG-2 standard for the compression of audio and visual digital 
signals); Letter from Joel Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Garrard R. Beeney, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf [hereinafter Sony Review Letter] (approving a 
patent pool for DVD-ROM and DVD-Video formats for Sony et al.); Letter from Joel I. Klein, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Carey R. Ramos, Attorney, Paul, 
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf [hereinafter Toshiba Review Letter] (approving a 
patent pool for DVD-ROM and DVD-Video formats for Toshiba et al.).  But see In re Summit Tech., 
Inc., 127 F.T.C. 208, 219–22 (1999) (dismantling a patent pool because the patent holders were the 
only firms authorized in the United States to use the patented technology and because the pooling 
arrangement was entered into for the purpose of restraining competition and fixing prices). 
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competitive harm posed by other aspects of the program.”125  Successful 
patent pool proposals called for an independent expert in the relevant 
technology to determine the essentiality of each patent in the pool; 
included a joint licensing arrangement which preserved each patent 
holder’s right to independently license its patents and enforce its patent 
rights against infringement; ensured no foreclosure of competition in 
relevant markets; and produced positive effects on innovation in which 
pool participants agree to license to each other “essential” patents they 
obtain in the future.126   
B.  The FTC and the DOJ’s Reaffirmation of the Antitrust–IP Guidelines in 
2007 
In the spring of 2007, the FTC and the DOJ issued a joint report, 
Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights (Antitrust 
Enforcement Report), reaffirming the agencies’ policies set forth in the 
1995 Antitrust-IP Guidelines.127  In it, the agencies espoused their earlier 
analysis, adding further reinforcement to the notion that IP and antitrust 
laws “work in tandem” and “share the same fundamental goals” of 
promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare by bringing new 
and better technologies, products, and services to consumers at lower 
prices.128  Reaffirming the agencies’ policies that IP rights do not 
automatically violate the antitrust laws,129 the Antitrust Enforcement 
Report stated that the antitrust enforcement agencies would continue to 
analyze IP licensing arrangements using a “rule of reason” approach that 
considers both their efficiencies and potential anticompetitive effects.130 
                                                                                                                          
125 See, e.g., Sony Review Letter, supra note 124, at 9.  
126 See, e.g., Toshiba Review Letter, supra note 124, at 3–10, 14–15; see also Sony Review 
Letter, supra note 124, at 4–8, 13.  A patent is “‘essential,’” the DOJ concluded, if there is no 
alternative to it in implementing the pooled technology.  Toshiba Review Letter, supra note 124, at 3.   
127 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.  The Antitrust Enforcement Report 
represented the culmination of ten months’ worth of hearings, entitled “Competition and Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy” jointly conducted by the DOJ and the 
FTC in 2002.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
128 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 1. 
129 Id. at 2; see also ANTITRUST–IP GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at § 2.2 (“The Agencies will not 
presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner.”). 
130 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 85.  A dominant approach to antitrust 
cases in the early part of the twentieth century, the modern rule of reason analysis is not wholly 
unrecognizable from that espoused by Justice Brandeis.  See Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. 
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, 
restrains.”).  In the context of patent pools, the DOJ’s modern version of the rule of reason is somewhat 
updated and tailored to address the particular circumstances that may question an antitrust violation.  In 
these situations, the DOJ will generally analyze the relationship of the intellectual property rights being 
pooled; the nature of the markets in which those rights compete; the extent to which the pool controls 
access to those rights; the openness of the pool to outsiders; and the extent to which the arrangement 
controls the terms on which future innovations in the field will reach the market.  Klein Address, supra 
note 56, at 4. 
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During the FTC and DOJ’s 2002 joint hearings,131 many panelists 
highlighted the efficiencies and pro-competitive benefits of patent pools.132  
One panelist proclaimed that “[p]atent pools have become critically 
important mechanisms for enabling widespread use of new technologies 
that require access to a multitude of patents dispersed among a multitude of 
parties.”133  After reviewing these submissions and perspectives on the 
interplay between patent pools and antitrust law, the Antitrust Enforcement 
Report concluded that the agencies’ patent pool analysis—as outlined in 
the 1995 Antitrust-IP Guidelines and as supplemented in several business 
review letters issued by the DOJ and enforcement actions by the FTC—
provided adequate guidance for the formation and implementation of 
future patent pools.134   
C.  Recommendations for Avoiding Antitrust Violations for a Genomic 
Patent Pool 
When assembling a genomic patent pool, it is essential to bear in mind 
the history of the relationship between antitrust law and IP rights and to 
consider how best to maintain the pro-competitive effects of a robust 
marketplace while also providing appropriate patent protection to promote 
future innovation.  It is worth noting that the Antitrust-IP Guidelines, the 
DOJ’s business review letters and subsequent patent pool approvals, and 
the Antitrust Enforcement Report, taken together, are a remarkable 
endorsement of the potential for patent pools to preserve competition and 
advance the development of new technologies.  While future patent pools 
will certainly not go unchecked by the antitrust enforcement agencies, if 
structured properly, they should be able to withstand FTC and DOJ 
scrutiny.  Therefore, before requesting a proposed business practice review 
from the Antitrust Division of the DOJ135 or an advisory opinion from the 
FTC,136 it will be important for a genomic patent pool to ensure that they 
steer clear of potential antitrust violations.  
                                                                                                                          
131 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
132 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 64–66. 
133 See Competition and Intellectual Property Law Transcript, supra note 101, at 700 (Steve Fox); 
see also Futa Testimony, supra note 99 (explaining that the MPEG-2 patent pool includes more than 
425 essential patents in 39 countries owned by 20 companies and a leading university and that 
widespread adoption of MPEG-2 technology “has made video communication interoperable, global, 
competitive, innovative and efficient”). 
134 ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 66–67. 
135 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2008) provides the procedure under which the Antitrust Division of the DOJ 
will state its enforcement intentions for proposed business conduct. 
136 The FTC considers and responds to requests for advisory opinions pursuant to 16 C.F.R. §§ 
1.1–1.4 (2008). 
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V.  EXAMINING THE PRECEDENTS: EXAMPLES OF COLLABORATIVE IP 
MANAGEMENT  
Although successful patent pools are frequently found in consumer 
electronics industries such as radio, semiconductors, DVD, and MPEG-2 
compression technology, there is evidence that patent pools can be 
successful in the health and biomedical industries as well.  The SNP 
Consortium and the patent pool for the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) vaccine are both evidence of the collaborative spirit 
necessary for successful patent pools in the life sciences and that public 
and private actors can work together to achieve biotechnological progress.  
These collaborative strategies have set a precedent for creating patent pools 
in the biomedical sciences.   
While the science of pharmacogenomics is still developing, one area 
that is well-suited for patent pool arrangements today is diagnostics.  
Developing diagnostic tests will help to identify which genomic sub-group 
patients belong to in order to accurately diagnose and tailor their treatment 
regimens to their genotypes.  As genomic knowledge increases, so too will 
the number of patents involved in diagnostics.  Patent pools, if structured 
properly, will be able to effectively navigate the patent thicket so that 
scientists can focus on developing diagnostic tests and advancing 
pharmacogenomics. 
A.  The SNP Consortium  
In the late 1990s, scientists began to appreciate the value of single 
nucleotide polymorphisms, commonly referred to as SNPs, for their use as 
“disease markers” and their inestimable value as diagnostic tools in 
genomic research.137  When the French biotechnology firm Genset began 
applying for patents on an undisclosed number of SNPs, several “big 
pharma” companies began to fear that an inevitable flurry of SNP patents 
would threaten the development of genetic diagnostics and, relatedly, 
personalized medicine.138  In response, in April 1999, a group of ten major 
pharmaceutical companies and the U.K.’s Wellcome Trust announced the 
creation of the SNP Consortium, a non-profit enterprise with the goal of 
placing a human genome-wide SNP map in the public domain.139  By 
                                                                                                                          
137 Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 189 
(2004).  An SNP is a one base pair variation in a DNA sequence that can sometimes affect a person’s 
disease susceptibility or influence their response to certain drug regimens.  As a result of SNP detection 
and research, diagnostics for many diseases can be improved.  See Human Genome Project 
Information: SNP Fact Sheet, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/faq/snps. 
shtml#whoare (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
138 See Merges, supra note 137, at 189; Ken Garber, Homestead 2000: The Genome, SIGNALS, 
Mar. 3, 2000, http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/657b06742b5748e888256570005cba01/ 
fd168fb6c42acf6e882568950015e2d0?OpenDocument.  
139 See Allen C. Nunnally et al., Intellectual Property and Commercial Aspects of 
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enabling a “better understanding of the relative positioning of genes along 
the human genome . . . [a] standardized SNP map was predicted to be of 
great value in drug discovery.”140 
While the initial goal was to identify and map 300,000 SNPs, evenly 
spaced throughout the human genome, the Consortium surpassed that 
target by placing a database containing approximately 1.8 million SNPs in 
the public domain.141  In doing so, the Consortium offered the international 
medical research community free access to a high-quality genetic map of 
common DNA sequences that could be useful in accelerating the 
development of personalized medicine.142  These collaborative efforts were 
spurred by the idea that placing SNPs in the public domain would facilitate 
whole-genome disease gene association studies, considered the “key” to 
unlocking the genetic origins of complex diseases such as Alzheimer’s 
disease, diabetes, cancer, heart disease, and schizophrenia.143  Thus, the 
ultimate goal of the SNP Consortium’s mapping initiative was to help 
scientists more quickly identify the specific genes associated with disease 
and to develop novel diagnostic tests and custom-tailored medicines.144 
In theory, several SNPs might be present in an important gene (e.g., a 
common mutated gene that causes Alzheimer’s disease) such that any firm 
involved in studying, testing for, or even developing a therapy to treat a 
particular disease, would have to obtain a license from each of several 
patentees.145  Problems associated with royalty stacking, holdups, and an 
increasingly dense patent thicket would appear to be inevitable.  Moreover, 
the transaction costs of negotiating multiple licenses to multiple mutations, 
                                                                                                                          
Pharmacogenomics, in PHARMACOGENOMICS, SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 126 
(Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2003).  Contributing pharmaceutical companies, which together committed at 
least $30 million to the Consortium’s efforts included APBiotech, AstraZeneca Group PLC, Aventis, 
Bayer Group AG, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo Wellcome PLC, IBM, 
Motorola, Novartis AG, Pfizer Inc., Searle, and SmithKline Beecham PLC.  The U.K.’s Wellcome 
Trust contributed at least $14 million.  See Human Genome Project Information: SNP Fact Sheet, supra 
note 137.  
140 Frank Grassler & Mary Ann Capria, Patent Pooling: Uncorking a Technology Transfer 
Bottleneck and Creating Value in the Biomedical Research Field, 9 J. COM. BIOTECH. 111, 113 (2003). 
141 See Human Genome Project Information: SNP Fact Sheet, supra note 137.  Now that the 
discovery phase has been completed, emphasis has shifted to studying SNPs in populations.  Many 
members of the SNP Consortium have now moved on to a more ambitious project: mapping associated 
groups of SNPs in “haplotype blocks” to form a “haplotype map” (or “HapMap”).  See International 
HapMap Project Home Page, supra note 35.  As of 2007, an updated haplotype map revealed over 3.1 
millions SNPs.  See The International HapMap Consortium, A Second Generation Human Haplotype 
Map of Over 3.1 Million SNPs, 449 NATURE 851 (2007). 
142 Kristen Philipkoski, Making Medicine to Fit, WIRED, Apr. 16, 1999, http://www.wired.com/ 
science/discoveries/news/1999/04/19159. 
143 Garber, supra note 138. 
144 Philipkoski, supra note 142 (quoting Arthur Holden, the SNP Consortium’s director: “It’s in 
those nucleotides that we hope to begin to identify the genetics associated with diseases or 
susceptibility or different responses to medical therapies . . . .”). 
145 Merges, supra note 137, at 189–90. 
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SNPs, and diagnostic tests would quickly become prohibitive.146  Instead 
of succumbing to the anticommons, the SNP Consortium ensured public 
access to the most fundamental and valuable diagnostic research tools.  
And by working with public research institutions such as the National 
Human Genome Research Institute,147 as well as with private entities, the 
SNP database helped to accelerate the research process so that scientists 
could begin to develop better therapies for serious diseases more quickly 
and efficiently.148  
Although not a formal patent pool,149 the SNP Consortium 
demonstrates that pooled IP and collaborative efforts by several different 
entities can achieve both a cost-efficient and pro-competitive outcome.150  
As such, the SNP Consortium is an excellent example of private parties 
taking measures into their own hands in order to counteract the threat of an 
anticommons.151  The private companies involved in the Consortium 
understood that they would all eventually need access to a multitude of 
SNPs for their collective commercial success, and, recognizing the long-
term benefits of a cooperative venture, decided to pool their resources and 
work together.152  The SNP Consortium can therefore serve as a precedent 
for patent pools in pharmacogenomics since a spirit of collaboration and 
shared vision of mutually advantageous IP arrangements are two of the 
essential features necessary to form a successful patent pool.    
B.  The SARS Patent Pool 
When SARS broke out in late 2002, many research institutes and 
private firms rushed to sequence the SARS genome and apply for 
patents.153  The World Health Organization (WHO) set up a network of 
                                                                                                                          
146 Ebersole et al., supra note 37, at 7. 
147 National Human Genome Research Institute, http://www.genome.gov/ (last visited Mar. 15, 
2009) (one of twenty-seven research institutes that make up the National Institute of Health, with the 
specific task of understanding the structure and function of the human genome and its role in health and 
disease). 
148 Philipkoski, supra note 142.   
149 The primary difference between the SNP Consortium and a traditional patent pool is that the 
goal of the former is to place SNPs into the public domain rather than, in the case of a patent pool, 
requiring users to obtain a license from the pool in order to gain access to the information.  OECD 
REPORT, supra note 17, at 68.  
150 Grassler & Capria, supra note 140, at 113.  
151 Merges refers to this type of collaboration as “property-preempting investments” (PPIs), which 
exist for the explicit purpose of preempting the potentially stifling intellectual property rights claims of 
economic competitors.   Merges, supra note 137, at 185–86.   
152 Moreover, the fact that the Consortium comprises both public and private funding and 
advances commercial and noncommercial interests suggests that alternative contractual solutions to the 
access problem in IP do exist and may function well under certain circumstances.  OECD REPORT, 
supra note 17, at 68. 
153 Knowledge Ecology International, IGWG Submission on Collective Management of 
Intellectual Property—The Use of Patent Pools to Expand Access to Essential Medical Technologies 3 
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laboratories to research and contain the disease, subsequently leading to 
the isolation of the causative virus and the sequencing of its genome.154  
These findings led to several of the participating researchers filing a 
multitude of patent applications incorporating various parts of the SARS 
genome.155  The rapid containment and sequencing of SARS is an example 
of the effectiveness of scientific collaboration, as well as an apt illustration 
of how the recent explosion in genomics-related patents has led to a thicket 
of fragmented IP rights that create an obstacle to the R&D of products that 
could benefit public health.156   
As public health officials struggled to effectively navigate the SARS 
patent thicket, the WHO SARS Consultation Group and the key SARS IP 
owners created the “SARS IP Working Group” in order to work together to 
address the need to develop a vaccine in the face of an IP rights and public 
health nightmare.157  Concerned that R&D would be “delayed and 
constricted by the multiplicity of patents,” the SARS IP Working Group 
proposed forming a patent pool in order to package all relevant information 
and patents in an efficient manner.158  The proposed patent pool would 
comprise patents incorporating genomic sequences of SARS so that R&D 
could take place downstream, thus stimulating greater investment in a 
SARS vaccine.159  Not only might the patent pool lead to the development 
of vaccines against SARS, but it would also “set the precedent that may 
help the formation of analogous pools in other areas of the life sciences 
that face similar issues, such as malaria, tuberculosis and avian influenza, 
and lead to increased dissemination of key technologies that might help 
combat disease.”160  If created, the SARS patent pool could produce a 
mutually advantageous situation for all parties involved; the pool would 
enable patent holders to commercialize their inventions and licensees could 
gain access to important patented technology in order to more quickly 
                                                                                                                          
(KEI Research Note Sept. 30, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/second/ 
contributions_section2/Section2_ManonRess-PatentPool.pdf [hereinafter KEI Research Note].  
154 James H.M. Simon et al., Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Intellectual 
Property Rights: The Possible Role of Patent Pooling, 83 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 707, 707 
(2005), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/9/707.pdf.   
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 709. 
157 KEI Research Note, supra note 153, at 3.   
158 Id.  
159 Simon et al., supra note 154, at 709 (explaining that the SARS patent pool would enable 
widespread access to the genomic sequence of SARS, thus driving competition away from patenting 
sequences and toward focusing on developing innovative products using those sequences). 
160 Id.  Simon et al. further concluded that the SARS situation was ideal for setting a precedent for 
patent pools in the life sciences because of its relative simplicity, namely, that all the patent 
applications were at a similar, early stage of patent prosecution; the potential pool members were 
limited in number; there was not yet a significant market for SARS-related products covered by the 
patents; the parties were either public health organizations or closely linked with such organizations; 
and the public health implications of SARS provided a strong incentive to move forward.  Id. 
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develop a vaccine, thus leading to an overall public health benefit.  
While the SARS patent pool has not yet come to fruition,161 its support 
by public health organizations, such as WHO and the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), demonstrates the potential for patent pool success in 
biotechnology and medicine.  Similarly, a number of other industry sectors 
have received proposals for the creation of patent pools, especially in the 
area of access to essential medical technologies in developing countries.162  
In response to an increasing recognition of the disproportionate access to 
medical technology in developing countries, WHO’s Secretariat on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property commissioned an 
intergovernmental working group to examine these proposals.163  The 
result was not only an acknowledgment by WHO that patent pools may be 
a feasible option to improving access to medical technologies, but also a 
recognition that they may promote innovation.164  And in July 2008, 
UNITAID agreed in principle to establish a patent pool to expand access to 
more appropriate and affordable medicines in low and middle income 
countries.165  With every additional proposal for patent pools in areas such 
                                                                                                                          
161 As of the fall of 2005, the SARS patent pool proposal had gained support from WHO and the 
NIH’s Office of Technology Transfer.  The relevant parties had been identified, a principle agreement 
between the parties had been reached, a letter of intent to form the patent pool had been signed, and 
legal experts had been retained to provide their antitrust and intellectual property expertise to the 
project on a pro bono basis.  See id. at 709.  To date, however, the full agreement has not yet been 
completed, highlighting the potentially lengthy timeframe and difficulty in setting up patent pools. 
162 Examples include an Essential Patent Pool for AIDS (EPPA) and an Essential Medical 
Inventions Licensing Agency (EMILA), both of which were motivated by the crises in access to 
essential treatments for AIDS and access to medical products and vaccines in developing countries.  
See Letter from Essential Inventions, Inc. to WHO, UNAIDS, and The Global Fund (Jan. 17, 2005), 
available at http://www.essentialinventions.org/docs/eppa/cover17jan05.pdf; see also Knowledge 
Ecology International, EMILA Working Plan (June 1, 2007), available at http://www.keionline. 
dforg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=64&Itemid=44.   
163 In May 2006, at the Fifty-Ninth World Health Assembly, Member States established an 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (IGWG).  
The Working Group’s mandate was to prepare a global strategy and plan of action on public health, 
innovation and intellectual property to discuss ways to foster innovation, build capacity and improve 
access to health products in order to achieve better health outcomes in developing countries.  See World 
Health Assembly Resolution on Public Health, Innovation, Essential Health Research and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Towards a Global Strategy and Plan of Action, WHA Res. 59.24, 59th World Health 
Assembly, 9th plen. mtg. (May 27, 2006), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/ 
WHA59/A59_R24-en.pdf. 
164 In May 2008, the Sixty-First World Health Assembly adopted Resolution WHA 61.21.  See 
World Health Assembly Resolution on Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHA Res. 61.21, 61st World Health Assembly, 8th plen. mtg, 
WHO Doc. WHA61/2008/REC.21 (May 24, 2008), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/ 
pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf (instructing the WHA to “examine the feasibility of voluntary patent 
pools of upstream and downstream technologies to promote innovation of and access to health products 
and medical devices”). 
165 Press Release, UNITAID, UNITAID Moves Towards a Patent Pool for Medicines (July 9, 
2008), available at http://www.unitaid.eu/en/NEWS/UNITAID-moves-towards-a-patent-pool-for-
medicines.html.  Established in 2006 through the initiative of the governments of France, Brazil, Chile, 
Norway and the United Kingdom, UNITAID is a drug purchasing facility aiming to improve access to 
treatments against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in developing countries.  The international 
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as genomic research, vaccines, and medical technologies, the IP, 
commercial, and scientific research communities take another step closer 
toward realizing the benefits of patent pools in pharmacogenomics. 
VI.  AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PATENT POOLS IN DIAGNOSTIC GENETIC 
TESTING  
The field of diagnostic genetics is more commercially focused than the 
broad field of genomics, or even biotechnology, and when further limited 
to individual diseases with standard mutations, it is ideal for patent 
pooling.166  In order to assess the risks of a particular polymutational 
disease, diagnostic tests are used to identify the genetic mutations that are 
correlated with the disease.167  Before performing any tests, however, 
scientists must first determine which mutations are significant for 
diagnosis, that is, which mutations should be considered “standard” when 
performing the tests.168  One of the largest challenges facing diagnostic 
genetics, however, is the patent thicket problem that arises when several 
patents are required in order to develop a diagnostic test for a particular 
polymutational disease.169  With genetic testing available for more than 
1500 diseases or conditions in more than 1250 clinical laboratories, it is 
easy to see how problems associated with patent exclusivity and royalty 
stacking can complicate the landscape of patent licensing.170  For those 
looking to offer diagnostic products to health care providers and their 
patients, patent pools offer an efficient alternative by making patents 
related to the diagnosis of polymutational diseases available at reasonable, 
                                                                                                                          
agency is funded primarily through a tax on airline tickets.  Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Effort for Lower 
Drug Prices Would Focus on Gaining Patents, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at F6, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File. 
166 Ebersole et al., supra note 37, at 10. 
167 Id. at 6.  A polymutational disease is a disease correlated with multiple genetic mutations on 
either a single gene or multiple genes.  Examples of polymutational diseases include Alzheimer’s 
disease, cystic fibrosis, hereditary breast and ovarian cancers, and hereditary hemochromatosis.  
Certain diseases such as Huntington’s or Canavan, both of which are caused by a single nucleotide 
mutation, might not be suitable for a patent pool because there will only be one patent owner for the 
genetic variation.  Id. at 6, 10. 
168 Id. at 6. 
169 For a practical example, see Turna Ray, Whole-Genome Sequencing Poses 'Serious Challenge' 
to US Patent System, HHS Finds, PHARMACOGENOMICS REP., Dec. 10, 2008, 
http://www.genomeweb.com (search “Whole-Genome Sequencing Poses 'Serious Challenge' to US 
Patent System, HHS Finds”; then follow hyperlink) (quoting the Navigenics website: “[I]f we obtain 
licenses from third parties to 10 patents, each covering the use of one SNP included in our service, and 
each subject to a royalty of between 1 percent and 5 percent of our net sales of the service, we would be 
required to pay between 10 percent and 50 percent of our net sales revenue—just for gene patent 
licenses!”).  
170 SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY, U.S. SYSTEM OF 
OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTING: A RESPONSE TO THE CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES 39 (2008), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/SACGHS_ 
oversight_report.pdf. 
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nondiscriminatory royalties.171   
A.  The Need for Efficiency in Diagnostics 
As licenses are necessary to develop new diagnostic tests, it is critical 
to facilitate such licensing through a system that is as efficient as 
possible.172  The availability of a patent pool as a mechanism for securing 
licenses, in reasonably practical and financially efficient terms, will 
encourage scientists to pursue research in different areas and will help 
persuade users (e.g., manufacturers and diagnostic laboratories) to seek 
those licenses and pay royalties.173 
A patent owner has exclusive control over his or her invention and 
therefore has the power to determine who may, or may not, use the 
invention.  In the case of a patented genetic sequence that is necessary in 
order to develop a new diagnostic test, the patent holder has the power to 
prevent others from testing for that particular genetic sequence.174  This 
exclusive control can serve as a hindrance for medical researchers trying to 
understand how a single mutation or mutated gene sequence affects the 
manifestation of a particular disease or the metabolism of a particular drug, 
especially if the patent holder is unwilling to grant a license.175  In such a 
case, a medical research facility seeking access to a multitude of licenses 
can easily get lost in the patent thicket, with license negotiations and other 
transaction costs delaying the process.176  Sometimes, a patent holder can 
have such restrictive licensing practices that they prevent other researchers 
and testing facilities from accessing the patented products.177  Thus, 
                                                                                                                          
171 Ebersole et al., supra note 37, at 7. 
172 S. Aymé et al., Patenting and Licensing in Genetic Testing, Recommendations of the European 
Society of Human Genetics, 16 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS S3, S7 (2008). 
173 Id.   
174 Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health 
Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 89 (2002). 
175 John H. Barton, Patents, Genomics, Research, and Diagnostics, 77 ACAD. MED. 1339, 1340 
(Dec. 2002).  Additional burdens can be imposed on licensees, for instance, if the patent holder 
demands that samples taken for diagnostic testing be sent to the patent holder’s laboratory for analysis 
rather than using the licensee’s own facilities.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Why the Gene Patent 
Controversy Persists, 77 ACAD. MED. 1381, 1382 (2002) (noting that professional associations of 
doctors and medical geneticists have been particularly outspoken critics of disease gene patents and 
exclusive licenses for DNA diagnostics).   
176 These delays have significantly affected clinicians seeking to provide diagnostic testing 
services and perform research using the patented material.  For example, a 2001 survey of clinical 
laboratory directors in the U.S. indicated that twenty-five percent stopped performing diagnostic tests 
due to patents and licenses, and fifty-three percent decided not to develop or perform a diagnostic test 
because of a patent.  Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical 
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003). 
177 This is the case of Myriad Genetics’ monopolization of diagnostic testing for breast cancer.  
See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA: A DISCUSSION PAPER 39–40 
(2002), available at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf 
(describing the patents granted to the U.S. company Myriad Genetics, giving it a monopoly on the 
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restrictive licensing practices and high transaction costs threaten to block 
the clinical use of diagnostic tests and inhibit follow-on research.178  Patent 
pools control these transaction costs and offer an efficient solution to the 
licensing challenges in diagnostics. 
B.  Patent Pools Are a Viable Option for the Field of Diagnostic Testing 
Unlike the broad area of biotechnology, diagnostics is a commercially 
focused industry in which all the players share common goals centered 
around accepted standards.179  Whereas the interests and goals of the 
players in the biotechnology or genomics markets are quite diverse and 
sometimes even contradictory, all market participants in the field of 
disease-specific diagnostic genetics share the same common goal: to 
provide accurate tests and analytic devices to health care professionals and 
their patients.180  To achieve this goal, the scientific community relies on a 
standard panel of genetic mutations that have been found to have 
significant predictive value for a given disease.181  Those in favor of patent 
pools for diagnostic genetics suggest that the American College of Medical 
Genetics (ACMG)182 could serve as the standard-setting body.183  Other 
possibilities include the NIH, WHO, OECD, and the Wellcome Trust, all 
of which have played important roles in collaboratives and are well-
positioned to broker these arrangements and evaluate the feasibility, 
                                                                                                                          
diagnosis of susceptibility to breast cancer linked to mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene 
sequences); see also Thomas M. Burton, Test for Breast-Cancer Risk Could Miss Mark, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 22, 2006, at D4, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (explaining that Myriad 
Genetics is the sole provider for the diagnostic tests for the BRCA gene mutations and charges up to 
$3000 for the test).  For a case study describing Myriad’s controversial IP strategies and hardball 
tactics, see generally E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy 
Storm (Int’l Expert Group on Biotech., Innovation and IP, Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/data/ieg/documents/cases/TIP_Myriad_Report.pdf. 
178 COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN GENOMIC & PROTEIN RESEARCH & INNOVATION, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND 
PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 111 
(2005) (“Because clinical research often is more efficiently done with an entire battery of tests, both 
blocking and an anti-commons might be in effect.”). 
179 Krattiger & Kowalski, supra note 7, at 141; see also Ebersole et al., supra note 37, at 10.  
Some commentators point to potential problems with forming patent pools in genomics, suggesting that 
the industry is too broad, industry players do not share common goals, and the technology advances too 
quickly to establish industry standards and identify essential patents for a patent pool.  Ebersole et al., 
supra note 37; see also Rochelle K. Seide & Michelle LeCointe, TRENDSPOTTER: Just Say No to 
Patent Pooling for Genomics, GENOMEWEB DAILY NEWS, July 13, 2001, http://www.genomeweb. 
com/issues/news/117309-1.html. 
180 Ebersole et al., supra note 37, at 10.  Regardless of whether or not the market participant is a 
commercial enterprise or a non-profit entity, both strive toward developing tests that minimize false 
negative or false positive results.  Id.  
181 Id. 
182 See ACMG Home Page, http://www.acmg.net (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).    
183 Ebersole et al., supra note 37, at 10.  There is already a precedent of the ACMG as a potential 
standard-setting body, as it has developed standards and guidelines for clinical genetics laboratories for 
Cystic Fibrosis and Huntington’s disease.  Verbeure et al., supra note 36, at 118. 
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benefits, and costs of patent pools in diagnostics.184  Furthermore, the 
criticism that a broad industry-wide patent pool would be too large and 
pose an anticompetitive threat would be absent in patent pools for 
diagnostic tests since each pool would focus only on one disease and only 
the essential and complementary patents would be included.185    
C.  How to Structure a Successful Patent Pool  
The structure of a patent pool in diagnostics should not be significantly 
different from the patent pools in other emerging technology fields.  In 
fact, much of the hard work involved in designing a framework for patent 
pools—eliminating the threat of an anticommons, demonstrating the long-
term efficiencies, determining the antitrust boundaries of anticompetitive 
behavior, and setting a precedent for the collaborative spirit required 
within an industry—has already been done.  In order to ensure that a patent 
pool is attractive to potential members and there is no threat of antitrust 
violation or high transaction costs, the following guidelines should be 
adopted. 
First, all licenses in the pool should be non-exclusive; that is, 
participating patent holders should retain the right to license their patents 
individually and independent of the pool.186  The non-exclusive nature of 
the pooled patents is important to ward off various antitrust concerns as 
well as to entice both private and public patent holders (i.e., research firms 
and university laboratories alike) to voluntarily join the pool.  Moreover, 
this criterion is particularly important for those firms holding patents 
whose full utility is unascertainable at the time of the formation of the 
pool. 
Second, an independent expert in the relevant technology should 
evaluate the current state of the art in order to determine which patents are 
“essential” to the technology and thus ought to be included in the pool.187  
                                                                                                                          
184 See id. at 119. 
185 Ebersole et al., supra note 37, at 10.  For instance, a diagnostic patent pool for Cystic Fibrosis 
would first require the standard-setting body to define the panel of standard mutations that, if present in 
an individual, would result in a greater likelihood of accurately diagnosing the disease.  Based on that 
panel, the patent pool’s independent expert would identify those essential and complementary patents 
covering those SNPs or genetic mutation sequences, including any blocking “isolated gene” patents.  
The pool would not include competing or substitute patents, nor would it include patents on non-DNA 
technology, such as chips, software, detection devices, or reagents.  In doing so, the pool would avoid 
multiple platforms in the same pool as well as any threats of collusion or otherwise anticompetitive 
behavior.  See generally id. 
186 See, e.g., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 79–80; see also MPEG-2 
Review Letter, supra note 124, at 12; Sony Review Letter, supra note 124, at 13–14; Toshiba Review 
Letter, supra note 124, at 15. 
187 A patent is “essential” if it is “necessarily infringed” or “there is no realistic alternative” to it in 
implementing the pooled technology.  Toshiba Review Letter, supra note 124, at 3.  A standard-setting 
body such as the ACMG would be the likely source for providing guidance as to what “essential” 
means and for whom and for what purpose. 
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These essential patents must be complements of, not substitutes for, each 
other.188  Throughout the duration of the patent pool, this expert should 
continue to monitor developments in the field so as to ensure that each 
patent’s essentiality is maintained, as well as to incorporate additional 
patents if necessary.  Providing a mechanism for future review is essential 
to ensuring the validity of each participating patent.189   
Third, access to the pool’s patent portfolio should be provided in a 
non-discriminatory manner.190  Any entity, whether a private firm or a 
public research facility, should have access to the pool’s patent portfolio.  
Non-discriminatory licensing will enhance the pro-competitive nature of 
the patent pool and ward off potential antitrust concerns of anticompetitive 
behavior.191 
Fourth, royalty rates should be reasonable and distributed in 
accordance with a pre-established formula.192  Determining the 
reasonability of a pool’s royalty rate scheme can, however, be challenging.  
While the Antitrust Enforcement Report states that the FTC and the DOJ 
will not interfere with royalty rate schemes, unreasonably high rates could 
raise concerns of collusion.193  The role of the independent patent expert 
discussed above could include the responsibility of providing a mechanism 
for determining the market value of each participating patent for the 
purpose of setting appropriate royalty rates within the patent pool.  There 
are a number of different possible royalty rate schemes, and the decision of 
the most appropriate scheme may be particular to each individual pool.194   
Fifth, the patent pool should not be run by the government or by any 
                                                                                                                          
188 MPEG-2 Review Letter, supra note 124, at 10.  Pooling substitute patents (i.e., patents that can 
be used in competition with each other) raises “serious competitive concerns” such as eliminating 
competition between the patents and price fixing.  If, on the other hand, the patent pool comprises 
complementary patent rights, it will be deemed “an efficient and pro-competitive method of 
disseminating those rights to would-be users.”  Limiting the pool to “technically essential patents, as 
opposed to merely advantageous ones,” ensures that the patents “are not competitive with each other.”  
Id. at 9–10. 
189 This feature will also help to eliminate the risk of free-riders, invalid or expired patents, and 
pool fragmentation.  See MPEG-2 Review Letter, supra note 124, at 9 (explaining that the starting 
point for an antitrust analysis of a patent pool is “an inquiry into the validity of the patents and their 
relationship to each other.”). 
190 See, e.g., Sony Review Letter, supra note 124, at 13; Toshiba Review Letter, supra note 124, 
at 14. 
191 See Ebersole et al., supra note 37, at 8–9. 
192 See, e.g., MPEG-2 Review Letter, supra note 124, at 12; Sony Review Letter, supra note 124, 
at 13; Toshiba Review Letter, supra note 124, at 14. 
193 See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 82–83.   
194 See Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) 
Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 25–45 (2005) 
(proposing the use of the “efficient component pricing rule” to determine a competitively neutral and 
nondiscriminatory licensing fee and to serve as a “safe harbor” in order to avoid allegations of 
anticompetitive price discrimination).  See generally Glenn S. Newman et al., How Reasonable Is Your 
Royalty?, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 2008, at 57–58 (discussing different valuation approaches to royalty 
rate setting).   
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member firm, but by an independent organization.195  While not absolutely 
necessary, maintaining the appearance of independence can be beneficial 
in persuading different types of potential participants to join the pool.  As 
discussed above, it is essential that both the public and private sectors work 
in concert to help move the pharmacogenomics industry forward.196   
Finally, patent pools in pharmacogenomics should consider employing 
a multi-tiered royalty schedule, with different patent portfolio license 
prices depending upon the nature of the use and the role of the licensee.  
This system could be an effective way to help address the research use 
exemption, a heated debate in modern IP, while simultaneously enhancing 
the attractiveness of patent pools.197 
Patent pools that conform to these criteria provide a “win-win” 
situation for pool participants, licensees, the industry, and the public at 
large.198 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As knowledge about the complex interactions between 
pharmaceuticals, genomics, and disease increases, there will be a 
concurrent proliferation of patents for pharmacogenomic-based inventions.  
Navigating the patent thicket will require a significant investment in 
negotiating licenses, monitoring the market for blocking patents, and 
litigating possible infringement suits.  These transaction costs—
prohibitively expensive for some and uncertain for all—threaten to stifle 
innovation and hinder further R&D.  Patent pools offer an alternative by 
minimizing the threat of an anticommons and allowing IP rights holders 
the chance to facilitate the advancement of new emerging technologies.   
Patent pools provide pro-competitive benefits by reducing transaction 
costs, distributing risks, and promoting the dissemination of technical 
information.  For an industry that is heavily dependent upon innovation 
and investment in IP, pharmacogenomics will be able to benefit 
significantly from these cost-saving and efficiency-enhancing features of 
patent pool arrangements.  While patent pools find their boundaries in 
antitrust law, both the FTC and the DOJ have provided guidance on how to 
structure patent pools while promoting competition and innovation.  
Collaborative efforts such as the SNP Consortium and the SARS patent 
pool proposal provide a precedent for the collaborative spirit necessary for 
patent pools as a mechanism to accelerate and focus research.  One 
                                                                                                                          
195 The patent pool’s administrator would presumably handle administrative tasks such as signing 
up licensees, collecting royalties from the licensees, and distributing the royalties to the essential patent 
holders.  See Kulbaski Testimony, supra note 79, at 1–2. 
196 See supra Part V.   
197 For a discussion of the research use exemption, see supra Part II.C. 
198 Kulbaski Testimony, supra note 79, at 2. 
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particular area where patent pools could make significant strides is in 
developing accurate and reliable diagnostic testing.  Much of the success of 
pharmacogenomics will rely on the methods developed and data 
accumulated through these new diagnostics.  Thus, encouraging R&D of 
diagnostic testing is critical.  Patent pools with multi-tiered royalty 
schedules will provide affordable access to patented diagnostic 
technologies such that important research as well as immediate consumer 
use can take place.  Facilitating scientific innovation and improving access 
to pharmacogenomics will greatly enhance the future of personalized 
medicine.  Creative working solutions such as patent pools provide the 
opportunity to make this happen. 
